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Thomas R.R. Cobb and the
Law of Negro Slavery
Paul Finkelman*
From the Revolution until the Civil War Southern intellectu-
als, professionals, and politicians developed and articulated elabo-
rate defenses of slavery. The most significant proslavery legal
scholar was Thomas R.R. Cobb, a Georgia attorney, law professor
and one-time reporter for the Georgia Supreme Court. His trea-
tise, An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States
of America,' profoundly illustrates the way antebellum Southern
lawyers and judges used their learning and talents to support
slavery.
Proslavery advocates, such as Cobb, emphatically insisted on
the justice and morality-the essential rightness-of slavery.
Cobb believed that racially based slavery was a prerequisite for a
truly "republican equality"2 because only in such a system were all
whites equal in status, regardless of their wealth, property, or sta-
tion in life. Thus, according to Cobb, racially based slavery allowed
all white citizens of the nation to "imbibe freedom with their
mother's milk."3 Under Cobb's view of the world, slavery was not
an evil, but a positive good that preserved American liberty, and
without slavery, freedom in America would be threatened.
* Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Tulsa College of
Law. I thank my former research assistant, Dawn Kostuik, for her efforts in help-
ing me with this article. A grant from the University of Akron School of Law gen-
erously supported the research for this article while I taught there as the John F.
Seiberling Professor of Constitutional Law.
1. Thomas R.R. Cobb, An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the
United States of America. To Which is Prefixed, An Historical Sketch of Slavery
(Paul Finkelman ed., Univ. of Georgia Press 1999) (1858) [hereinafter Cobb,
Inquiry].
2. Id. at ccxiii.
3. Id.
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But, Cobb also knew that the North, and indeed most of the
rest of the Western world, believed slavery was fundamentally
wrong and immoral. Thus, one of Cobb's goals in his Inquiry was
to convince lawyers outside the South that slavery was consistent
with American law, good public policy, Christian morality, and the
natural order of things.4 Cobb did not merely collaborate with a
system of evil, he worked hard to recast the very notion of evil to
remove slavery from within its definition.
I. THE PECULIARITY OF AMERICAN SLAVERY
To understand Cobb and other proslavery legal theorists, law-
yers and judges, it is important to first consider the peculiar nature
of American slavery. In the years preceding the Civil War, Ameri-
cans, North and South, called slavery a "peculiar institution."5
Slavery of course had been found in most other cultures and civili-
zations.6 Thus, the sociologist Orlando Patterson argues that
"[t]here is nothing notably peculiar about the institution of slavery.
It has existed from before the dawn of human history right down to
the twentieth century, in the most primitive of human societies
and in the most civilized."7 With only slight exaggeration, Patter-
son noted that slavery has been in every "region on earth" and
claimed that "[pirobably there is no group of people whose ances-
tors were not at one time slaves or slaveholders."8
Despite slavery's presence in most cultures and most eras,
slavery in the Americas was fundamentally different; and slavery
in the United States was even more unique and peculiar. There
4. There were, of course, numerous Southern clergymen who argued that the
Bible supported slavery and that in turn, masters were obligated to take care of
the bodies and the souls of their slaves. See, e.g., Rev. H.N. McTyeire, et al., Duties
of Masters to Servants: Three Premium Essays (1851). This volume was published
in Charleston, South Carolina by the Southern Baptist Publication Society.
5. Kenneth M. Stampp, The Peculiar Institution: Slavery in the Ante-Bellum
South 3 (1968). Southerners often referred to slavery as "a 'peculiar institution.'"
Id.
6. For global coverage of slavery in all times and all cultures, see 1 Macmil-
lan Encyclopedia of World Slavery (Paul Finkelman & Joseph C. Miller eds., 1998);
2 Macmillan Encyclopedia of World Slavery (Paul Finkelman & Joseph C. Miller
eds., 1998).
7. Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study vii
(1982).
8. Id. The only exception to this seems to be among the Eskimo and Inuit
peoples of the far North and among the aboriginal people of Australia. See
Finkelman & Miller, supra note 6.
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were two reasons for this: the racial nature of slavery in the Ameri-
cas and the presence of human bondage in a society predicated on
political democracy, republican government and fundamental
equality.
A. The Racial Basis of Slavery in the Americas
The most distinctive aspect of American slavery was its racial
basis. This was unique to the New World. Certainly, most cul-
tures enslaved rival ethnic and racial groups-foreigners and
barbarians as they often called them-but this enslavement was
not necessarily because of the ethnicity, color, or religion of the en-
slaved. Rather, they were enslaved because they were rivals or en-
emies. Thus, in ancient Rome there were slaves from all cultures
known to the Roman world. Most slaves in Rome were defeated
enemies and barbarians from the fringes of the Empire. However,
many of these enslaved "barbarians" were racially no different
from their masters. Sometimes the foreigners were culturally sim-
ilar as well. In addition, throughout the ancient world residents
and citizens of all countries were enslaved for crimes, for debt or
because of unfortunate twists and turns in their lives. As the great
classical scholar Moses I. Finley observed, "There were Greek
slaves in Greece, Italian slaves in Rome."9 In fact, everywhere in
the ancient world people of any color or race could conceivably be
slaves or masters or both.10 The same was true in other times and
places. In China, Africa, the Indian subcontinent, pre-Columbian
Mexico, South America, Hawaii, and the Pacific Northwest people
regularly enslaved their neighbors. Europeans enslaved each
other from antiquity to the modern period.1 ' The word "slave" it-
self is derived from the Slavic peoples, who were commonly en-
9. M.I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modem Ideology 118 (1980).
10. As historian Carl Deglar notes "[tihere was a time in antiquity when any-
one, regardless of nation, religion, or race, might be a slave." Carl N. Deglar, The
Irony of American Negro Slavery, in Perspectives and Irony in American Negro
Slavery 3, 19 (Harry P. Owens ed., 1976).
11. In the 1940s, Germans enslaved their fellow countrymen (as well as Rus-
sians, Poles, and other Europeans). Those sent to German industries as slaves or
sent to German slave labor camps (as opposed to death camps like Auschwitz)
were often physically indistinguishable from those who commanded their labor.
However, under German theories of race, those enslaved were designated as mem-
bers of different races or as politically corrupted.
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slaved by other Europeans in the early Middle Ages. 12 Indeed,
nowhere in the pre-Columbian world was color or race a mark of
slavery nor was enslavement tied to race.
But, in the Americas slavery was always tied to race. In the
Spanish colonies the first slaves were Indians, but after 1517
Spain began to shift to African labor. A few native people were
also captured and sold as slaves in the British mainland colonies,
but by the end of the seventeenth century slaves in British
America were almost exclusively of African ancestry. As early as
1806, Virginia's highest court had asserted that blackness created
a presumption of slavery. 13 By the antebellum period every slave
state but Delaware 14 accepted the legal concept that "the black
color of the race raises the presumption of slavery."' 5
This Africanization of slavery led the English colonists to asso-
ciate slavery with race. This in turn led to concepts of racism in
what became the United States. 16 For antebellum Southerners,
like Cobb, the connection between slavery and race seemed obvious
and natural. Part of Cobb's mission as a legal scholar was to ex-
plain that connection to non-Southerners and to use the connection
to justify slavery to Northerners, especially Northern lawyers. For
Cobb and other proslavery theorists the central aspect of slavery
was race, which justified Southern legal practices that dramati-
cally departed from Anglo-American legal traditions.
12. Webster's Third International Dictionary of the English Language 2139
(3d ed. 1986).
13. Hudgins v. Wrights, 1 Hen. & M. (Va.) 134 (1806).
14. State v. Dillahunt, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 551 (1840). See generally Thomas D.
Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619-1860, at 21-22 (1996) (noting that
Delaware no longer recognized that blackness was a presumption of slavery).
15. Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, § 69, at 67 (footnote omitted).
16. The debate over the origins of slavery and racism is the most important
"chicken or egg" issue in American history. See generally Winthrop D. Jordan,
White Over Black: American Attitudes Toward the Negro, 1550-1812, at 44-98
(1968) (arguing that racism preceded slavery and that English settlers of the New
World were predisposed to believe Africans were inferior to whites). I believe that
this argument is deeply flawed, and that the early legal records of Virginia and
elsewhere suggest that in fact the English in North America were far more egalita-
rian than later Americans. See Paul Finkelman, The Law of Freedom and Bond-
age: A Casebook 1-25 (1986). The most important work along these lines is
Edmund S. Morgan, American Slavery American Freedom: The Ordeal of Colonial
Virginia (1975).
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B. Slavery in a Nation Dedicated to the Proposition that All
Men are Created Equal
While its racial basis made New World slavery different, no-
tions of egalitarian democracy made slavery in the United States
truly peculiar. Before the American Revolution there was no deep
contradiction between American slavery and Anglo-American cul-
ture. Although the practice of slavery ran counter to the laws and
customs of England, there were few strong ideological arguments
that threatened slavery in the colonies. Except for a few religious
arguments against slavery,' 7 there was no real theoretical attack
on slavery until the eve of the American Revolution.18 The British
world, after all, was built on concepts of hierarchy and status.
Thus, there was no need to create an ideological defense of slavery
because "slave" was just one more status in this hierarchical re-
gime of the British Empire.
True, the English common law presumed freedom and certain
legal protections, which bondage denied to slaves. In 1772, Brit-
ain's highest court, in Somerset v. Stewart,19 ruled that slavery vio-
lated the fundamental right of liberty guaranteed by English law
and traditions. Speaking for the Court of King's Bench, Chief Jus-
tice Lord Mansfield held that "the state of slavery is of such a na-
ture, that it is incapable of being introduced on any reasons, moral
or political," but could only be created by "positive law."20 Under
Lord Mansfield's ruling, a slave brought into England could claim
liberty.
Although the reasoning of Somerset might logically apply to
the American colonies, 21 the decision itself was narrowly directed
17. In 1688, a Quaker meeting in Pennsylvania issued the first religious at-
tack on slavery in the modern era. See Germantown Protest Against Slavery, 1688,
reprinted in Kermit L. Hall et al., American Legal History: Cases and Materials
35, 35-36 (1991). Similarly, in 1700 the Puritan lawyer published a religiously
based attack on slavery. See Samuel Sewall, The Selling of Joseph (Sidney Kaplan
ed., Gehenna Press 1969) (1700).
18. See David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution,
1770-1823, at 48 (1975).
19. 98 Eng. Rep. 499, Lofft 1, 20 How. St. Tr. 1 (K.B. 1772).
20. Id. at 510.
21. During and after the Revolution some northern states accepted the logic of
Somerset, but, did so initially by adopting legislation to suspend its force. Thus, in
1780 Pennsylvania allowed visiting masters to keep their slaves in the state for six
months before they could become free and in 1817 New York passed a similar law
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at the metropolis 22 and not intended to remake social and eco-
nomic relations in the colonies. Somerset would have no effect on
the African slave trade or the commerce in slaves in the New
World colonies. In his opinion, Lord Mansfield specifically noted
that "[c]ontract for [the] sale of a slave" in another jurisdiction "is
good here; the sale is a matter to which the law properly and read-
ily attaches, and will maintain the price according to the agree-
ment."23 Mansfield clearly understood that the British Empire
was capable of banning slavery at home, while allowing it, and
even encouraging it, in the colonies. During the colonial period,
both the Crown and Parliament were content to let the planter
leadership of the American colonies create a new legal regime that
allowed slavery to develop, despite the fact that its very essence
was contrary to English common law. 24 Once the colonists had cre-
ated their own form of slavery, and especially after the formation
of the Royal Africa Company in 1672, the British government actu-
ally encouraged the development of the institution. Indeed, the
elite of England, including members of the Royal family, invested
in the African slave trade and in the slave-based plantations, espe-
cially those in the Caribbean.
However, the Revolution changed the ideological playing field.
The new nation's self-proclaimed political credo made American
slavery especially problematic. The ideological peculiarity of
American slavery emerged out of the conflict between human
bondage and the philosophical basis of the United States as a na-
tion-state: "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with cer-
tain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and
the pursuit of Happiness."25 On its face Jefferson's fine phrasing
seems to be the essence of anti-slavery rhetoric. If Americans took
this rhetoric seriously, and applied it to slavery, the Declaration
would pose a potential threat to the institution.
with a nine month grace period. See Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slav-
ery, Federalism, and Comity 46-47 (1981).
22. See William M. Wiecek, Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of
Slavery in the Anglo-American World, 42 U. Chi. L. Rev. 86 (1974).
23. Supra note 19, at 509.
24. See Jonathan A. Bush, The British Constitution and the Creation of Ameri-
can Slavery, in Slavery and the Law 379 (Paul Finkelman ed., 1997).
25. The Declaration of Independence (U.S. 1776).
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Since slavery existed in all the colonies, the Revolution did not
initially appear to threaten slavery. But, by the end of the Revolu-
tion the threat to slavery was palpable. It came from the ideology
of the new regime, the growing religious opposition to slavery, es-
pecially from Quakers and Methodists, and the dislocations of the
war itself.
The preamble to Pennsylvania's Gradual Emancipation stat-
ute of 1780 demonstrates the effect of the Revolutionary ideology
on slavery. 26
When we contemplate our abhorrence of that condition,
to which the arms and tyranny of Great-Britain were exerted
to reduce us, when we look back on the variety of dangers to
which we have been exposed, and how miraculously our
wants in many instances have been supplied, and our deliver-
ance wrought, when even hope and human fortitude have be-
come unequal to the conflict, we are unavoidably led to a
serious and grateful sense of the manifold blessings, which
we have undeservedly received from the hand of that Being,
from whom every good and perfect gift cometh. Impressed
with these ideas, we conceive that it is our duty, and we
rejoice that it is in our power, to extend a portion of that free-
dom to others, which hath been extended to us, and release
from that state of thraldom, to which we ourselves were ty-
rannically doomed, and from which we have now every pros-
pect of being delivered. 27
The Pennsylvania legislators noted that it was their duty to end
bondage, because the institution deprived "Negro and Mulatto
slaves.., of the common blessings that they were by nature enti-
tled to" and also led to the "unnatural separation and sale of hus-
band and wife from each other and from their children, an injury,
the greatness of which can only be conceived by supposing that we
were in the same unhappy case."28 With less flowery language,
Massachusetts incorporated the theory of the Declaration into its
1780 Constitution, which declared, "All men are born free and
26. An Act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery: Act of March 1, 1780, re-
printed in Finkelman, supra note 16, at 42-45.
27. Id. at 42.
28. Id. § 2, at 43.
82 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:75
equal."29 The Massachusetts courts quickly interpreted this clause
to end slavery in the state.30
Thus, Massachusetts and Pennsylvania led the way towards
abolition in the North. By 1804, Massachusetts, New Hampshire
and the new states of Vermont and Ohio had abolished slavery out-
right, while Pennsylvania and the rest of the North had passed
gradual emancipation statutes which placed the institution on the
road to extinction.31 From the adoption of the Pennsylvania Grad-
ual Emancipation statute, until the eve of the Civil War, opponents
of slavery would turn to the Declaration of Independence to support
their cause. For these visionaries, at least, American slavery was
peculiar because freedom and equality were the true basis of the
nation.
C. The Southern Solution to the Revolutionary Ideology
In the end, the Declaration of Independence and the Revolu-
tion created a powerful challenge to slavery. In the North, the
events and ideology of the era helped bring about an end to slavery
and a heightened sense of the fundamental evil of human bondage.
Thus, the task for Southerners was to protect slavery and accom-
modate it within this new ideology of liberty and equality.
During the Revolution, Southerners responded to this threat
with a variety of defenses of slavery, usually based on necessity,
economics and history. As early as 1775, Thomas Lynch of South
Carolina told the delegates to the Continental Congress, "[Tihe
confederation was finished" if there was to be a debate over
"whether or not slaves were property."32 A decade later, South
Carolina's Charles Pinkney told the Constitutional Convention,
"[Mf slavery be wrong, it is justified by the example of all the world.
He cited the case of Greece Rome & other antient [sic] States; the
sanction given by France, England, Holland & other modern
29. Mass. Const. of 1780, Declaration of Rights, art. I.
30. See John D. Cushing, The Cushing Court and the Abolition of Slavery in
Massachusetts: More Notes on the "Quock Walker Case," 5 Am. J. Legal. Hist. 118,
133 (1961).
31. These laws were adopted in Pennsylvania (1780), Connecticut (1784),
Rhode Island (1784), New York (1799) and New Jersey (1804). The history of this
is discussed in Arthur Zilversmit, The First Emancipation: The Abolition of Slav-
ery in the North (1967).
32. Donald Robinson, Slavery in the Structure of American Politics, 1765-
1820, at 148 (W.W. Norton & Co. 1979) (1971).
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States."33 Pinkney asserted, "[I1n all ages one half of mankind
have been slaves."34 He warned that any attempt to prevent the
importation of slaves would "produce serious objections to the Con-
stitution which he wished to see adopted."35 His cousin, General
Charles Cotesworth Pinkney, added, "S. Carolina & Georgia can-
not do without slaves."38
Starting in the 1820s, Southerners would make similar argu-
ments as they moved from a defensive posture to the more aggres-
sive stance that has been characterized as the "positive good"
theory of slavery. Some of this argument was still economic. "Cot-
ton is king," thundered Senator James Henry Hammond, of South
Carolina, in his famous "Mud-Sill" speech, and "you dare not make
war on cotton."37 But the economic arguments only went so far. At
its heart, the positive good defense of slavery rested on notions of
race. By the 1820s, Southerners would use racial arguments to as-
sert that the enslavement of blacks was a blessing to the slaves
and a moral duty for the masters.
Supporters of slavery helped lay the groundwork for this the-
ory in the late Eighteenth Century. The primary author of the
Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson, also articulated
one of the first racially based defenses of slavery in his book, Notes
on the State of Virginia.38
For Jefferson, equality for blacks was impossible because he
thought "the real distinction which nature has made" between the
races went beyond color and other physical attributes. 39 Race,
more than their status as slaves, doomed blacks to permanent ine-
quality. In Notes on the State of Virginia, Jefferson asserted that a
harsh bondage did not prevent Roman slaves from achieving dis-
tinction in science, art or literature because "they were of the race





37. James Henry Hammond, "Speech on the Admission of Kansas,' March 4,
1858, "The Mud-Sill" Speech, in Slavery Defended: The Views of the Old South 121
(Eric L. McKitrick ed., 1963).
38. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia (William Peden ed.,
1954); see also Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the
Age of Jefferson 105-37(1996) (discussing Thomas Jefferson's proslavery beliefs,
policies and actions).
39. Jefferson, supra note 38, at 138.
84 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:75
of whites;" American slaves could never achieve such distinction
because they were not white.40 Jefferson argued that American In-
dians had "a germ in their minds which only" lacked "cultivation;"
they were capable of "the most sublime oratory."41 But, he had
never found a black who "had uttered a thought above the level of
plain narration; never see[n] even an elementary trait of painting
or sculpture."42 He found "no poetry" among blacks.43 Jefferson
argued that blacks' ability to "reason" was "much inferior" to
whites, while "in imagination they are dull, tasteless, and anoma-
lous." 44 In Jefferson's view they were "inferior to the whites in the
endowments, both of body and mind."45 Thus, blacks were ideally
suited for slavery and peculiarly unsuited for any other status.
Throughout the first half of the Nineteenth Century countless
other Southerners followed in Jefferson's steps, arguing that slav-
ery was legitimate and proper because blacks could never be any-
thing but slaves. They bolstered this argument with references to
the Bible, modern science, history, economic theory and all other
fields of knowledge. 46
II. COBB'S TREATISE
In 1858, on the eve of the Civil War, Thomas Reade Rootes
Cobb added to this proslavery literature with his treatise on slave
law, An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery.47 The Inquiry is
the most comprehensive antebellum restatement of the law of slav-
ery and the only treatise on slavery written by a Southerner.48 As
40. Id. at 142.
41. Id. at 140.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 139.
45. Id. at 143.
46. See William Sumner Jenkins, Pro-Slavery Thought in the Old South
(1935).
47. See Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1.
48. A few other lawyers wrote about the law of slavery to defend the institu-
tion. A good example is George S. Sawyer, Southern Institutes: Or, An Inquiry
into the Origin and Early Prevalence of Slavery and the Slave-Trade: With an
analysis of the Laws, History, and Government of the Institution in the Principle
Nations, Ancient and Modern, From the Earliest Ages Down to the Present Time.
With Notes and Comments in Defense of the Southern Institutions (photo reprint
1969) (1858). Sawyer has an essay of nearly one hundred pages on The Political
and Judicial Attitude of Slavery in the United States. Furthermore, his book is
filled with discussions of law in Rome, Biblical Israel, Europe and the United
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such, it was an important practical source for attorneys and judges
at the time of its publication and a vital tool for scholars of slavery
and legal historians ever since. It was also a significant addition to
proslavery legal theory. Finally, Cobb's treatise was a major work
of proslavery propaganda, aimed at the minds of Northern lawyers
and judges.
The timing of its publication--on the eve of the Civil War-
prevented the Inquiry from greatly influencing the development of
American slave law. Nevertheless, the volume provided legal gui-
dance and intellectual ammunition for some Southern jurists in
the years immediately preceding secession. Had the War not come
when it did, it is likely that Cobb's book would have become the
standard source for finding the law of slavery in the United States,
as well as the main tool for teaching that body of law to new attor-
neys. Indeed, even after the demise of slavery, courts still cited it
when considering the lingering effects of the peculiar institution.49
More than a century after its publication, a United States Supreme
Court justice found it useful for explaining what slavery was, and
therefore, for understanding the meaning of the Thirteenth
Amendment that abolished slavery., 0
Had the War not come, the book would also have served a sec-
ond, and in Cobb's mind, more important purpose. Cobb hoped it
would become a key text in convincing American lawyers-espe-
cially in the North-that slavery was not evil and that the South-
ern legal system was consistent with Anglo-American concepts of
fairness.
As a treatise in law and a work of proslavery propaganda, the
Inquiry is really two books in one.5' Part I is a 228 page preface
States. But this work contains no systematic discussion of the law of slavery. Un-
like Cobb's subtle defense of slavery, this is an unsophisticated wholesale assault
on the North and the antislavery movement combined with a dogmatic defense of
Dred Scott v. Sandford and other proslavery decisions.
49. See Brooke's Case, 2 Ct. Cl. (U.S. Court of Claims) 180 (1866); Morris v.
Williams, 39 Ohio St. 554 (1883); Irving v. Ford, 179 Mass. 216 (1901); Merrick v.
Betts, 214 Mass. 223 (1913); In re Estate of Campbell, 12 Cal. App. 707 (1910).
50. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 444 n.1 (1968) (Douglas,
J., concurring).
51. The prefatory material asserts that this is "Volume I" of what was to be a
multi-volume treatise. There is, however, no record that Cobb ever planned to
write a second volume. Perhaps he initially planned the Historical Sketch to be
Volume I and the Inquiry to be Volume II. Oddly, the only other reprint of Cobb,
done by Negro Universities Press in 1968, deleted all of the original publication
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which Cobb titled An Historical Sketch of Slavery.52 Following this
is a 317 page, twenty-two chapter treatise on The Law of Negro
Slavery.5 3 Perhaps aware of the intellectual difficulties of some of
his technical discussions of law, and doubtless trying to increase
his royalties and the distribution of his proslavery arguments,
Cobb subsequently published the Historical Sketch and the first
two chapters of the Inquiry as a separate volume.5 4
III. THoMAs R.R. COBB: SouTmERN LAWYER AND
CONFEDERATE LEADER
The importance of Cobb's treatise is in part tied to its author: a
leader of the Georgia bar, a prominent figure in Southern legal ed-
ucation, a key legal theorist of the secession movement, and the
central figure in the writing of the Constitution of the putative
Southern nation. Cobb was born in Jefferson County, Georgia on
April 10, 1823, the son of Colonel John Addison Cobb and Sarah
Rootes Cobb. His father, a wealthy planter, saw his cotton crop fail
in 1832 and then lost most of his remaining fortune in the depres-
sion that followed the Panic of 1837. Nevertheless, there was
enough money for Thomas to enter college in 1837, with his older
brother Howell paying for his last two years. In 1841, Cobb gradu-
ated first in his class at Franklin College, the precursor of the Uni-
versity of Georgia. A year later, at age eighteen, he gained
admission to the bar and began practicing in Athens. 55
information from the title page, including "Volume I" on the title page. This has
led to confusion among scholars, some of whom have used the original edition with
Volume I, and others who have used the incomplete 1968 reprint. This confusion
is avoided in the most recent reprint edition, cited in note 1, which both contains
the confusing original title page as well as an introduction which explains it.
52. See Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1. Cobb separately paginated this part with
Roman numerals.
53. See id.
54. Thomas R.R. Cobb, Historical Sketch of Slavery, From the Earliest Peri-
ods (Philadelphia: T & J.W. Johnson Co., and Savannah: W. Thorne Williams,
1858). This book is entirely paginated in Roman numerals. The first two chapters
of the Inquiry were appended to the end of the original Historical Sketch. These
pages were then repaginated, starting with page ccxxix and running to page cccii,
including the index.
55. Biographical information in this introduction comes mostly from William
B. McCash, Thomas R.R. Cobb: The Making of a Southern Nationalist (1983). See
also Robert K. Krick, Cobb, Thomas R.R., in 1 Encyclopedia of the Confederacy
362-65 (Richard N. Current ed., 1993) (elaborating on the life and times of Cobb);
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A. Cobb's Antebellum Career
Thomas Cobb's politically-connected relatives dramatically
shaped and influenced his career. His brother Howell served in the
United States Congress (1843-1851; 1855-1857), including one
term as Speaker of the House, as governor of Georgia (1851-1852)
and as Secretary of the Treasury under President James
Buchanan (1857-1860). After financing the last two years of his
younger brother's education, Howell helped Thomas obtain pa-
tronage jobs within Georgia. But equally important for his career
was Thomas' marriage, in January 1844, to Marion Lumpkin, the
daughter of one of the most important attorneys in the state, Jo-
seph Henry Lumpkin. This connection helped secure Cobb's fu-
ture, and eventually set the stage for his role as the South's
foremost commentator on the law of slavery.
The importance of his family connections first emerged in
1842, when Cobb's cousin, James Jackson, became the Secretary of
the Georgia Senate. Jackson immediately appointed Thomas, who
was only nineteen at the time, as a clerk for the Senate. A year
later he was the Assistant Secretary of the Senate, a promotion
secured with the aid of his future father-in-law, Joseph Lumpkin, a
powerful force in the Whig party, and his brother, Howell, a power-
ful Democrat.
In November 1845, he became the Secretary of the Senate,
largely through the influence of Howell. At the same time, he was
building a successful law practice, in part as a result of his political
connections, but also because of his rising reputation as one of the
smartest and most able attorneys in the state.
In late 1845, Georgia created its first state-wide supreme court
and Cobb's father-in-law became Chief Judge. Lumpkin appointed
Cobb to be the assistant reporter for the court. In 1849, Lumpkin
elevated his twenty-six-year-old son-in-law to the position of re-
porter for the Georgia Supreme Court. By this time, Cobb was well
on his way to economic security and even wealth. He owned a farm
in Cobb County, more than a dozen slaves, a fine carriage, town
lots in Athens, and timber land just outside the city.56 In addition
to his job as reporter, he had a growing private law practice. In
Biographical Dictionary of the Confederacy 142 (Jon L. Wakelyn ed., 1977) (sum-
marizing the early years and distinguished career of Cobb).
56. See McCash, supra note 55, at 32-33.
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1851, Cobb published his Digest of the Statute Laws of the State of
Georgia,57 which earned him more money, fame and new clients.
By 1852, he owned seventeen slaves, hundreds of acres of farm
land, town lots, two carriages, and various financial assets. 58 He
was now one of the most successful lawyers in the state, earning as
much as $7,000 a year from his legal practice, $1,000 a year as the
reporter for the state Supreme Court and l[enormous profits ...
from his Digest."59 In 1857, he resigned as Supreme Court Re-
porter, perhaps because he no longer needed the prestige, profes-
sional contacts or salary associated with the position. By the end
of the decade his wealth had tripled, and he was worth more than
$100,000,60 an enormous sum at that time. With twenty-three
slaves he was a bona fide planter.61 Thus, when he wrote the In-
quiry, Cobb had a huge personal stake in the system of slavery,
and equally important, a good deal of personal experience dealing
with slaves.
In 1859, he was appointed to help codify the laws of Georgia.
The end result, which did not become law until January 1, 1863, is
generally known as the Cobb Code, even though others had partici-
pated in its preparation and Cobb himself died twenty days before
the Code went into effect.6 2
In 1859, shortly after he agreed to help prepare the state Code,
Cobb joined his father-in-law and a family friend, William Hope
Hull, in organizing the Lumpkin Law School in Athens. This was
the first law school in the state and one of the few in the deep
South.63 About twenty-five students enrolled in the fall of 1859,
57. 1 Thomas R.R. Cobb, A Digest of the Statute Laws of the State of Georgia,
In Force Prior to the Session of the General Assembly of 1851 (1851); 2 Thomas
R.R. Cobb, A Digest of the Statute Laws of the State of Georgia, In Force Prior to
the Session of the General Assembly of 1851 (1851).
58. See McCash, supra note 55, at 53-54.
59. Id. at 53.
60. See id. at 66-67 n.102.
61. See id. at 67. Most historians consider twenty slaves to be the minimum
necessary for a farm to be a "plantation."
62. See The Code of the State of Georgia (R.H. Clark et al., codifiers 1861);
McCash, supra note 55, at 63-66.
63. Other law schools in the South included the University of North Carolina
(1845), Louisville (1846), Tulane (1847), Cumberland (1847), and the University of
Mississippi (1854). See David J. Langum & Howard P. Walthall, From Main-
stream to Maverick: Cumberland School of Law, 1847-1997, at 4-10 (1997); Robert
Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s, at
5, 13 (1983).
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and by 1861 the school had already awarded diplomas to forty-nine
graduates.6 The Lumpkin Law School, which was the forerunner
of the modern University of Georgia School of Law, was on track to
becoming a major training ground for Southern, proslavery law-
yers. But, the pressures of secession and the disruptions of war
forced a temporary closing of the school after the spring semester
in 1861. Ultimately, Southern defeat, and the battlefield death of
Cobb in 1862, made this closing permanent, although some years
after the war the remnants of the school would reemerge as the
University of Georgia School of Law.
B. Confederate Leader
Throughout the 1850s both Cobb brothers were staunch
Unionists. As Speaker of the House, Howell helped steer the Com-
promise of 1850 though Congress. This earned him the hatred of
many Democrats in the state, but it also helped get him elected
governor as an independent in 1851. Both Howell and Thomas be-
lieved that the best way to protect slavery was to remain in the
Union. Both correctly read the Constitution as being proslavery. 65
Doubtless they understood that the South was better off in a union
that protected slavery than it was as a small and vulnerable na-
tion, surrounded by a larger United States where there was no
slavery.
The Cobbs were clearly aware of the political power of slavery
within the Union. Since the creation of the national government
under the Constitution, slaveowners had been actively involved in
the national government, and in the 1850s, they remained power-
ful players in national politics. With the exception of John Adams
and John Quincy Adams, every American president had either
been a slaveowner or a Northerner who thoroughly supported slav-
ery. The Northern presidents who protected slavery, such as Mar-
tin Van Buren, Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan, did so
because they depended on Southern votes for their political suc-
cess.6 6 The Cobb brothers knew, from personal experience, that
64. See McCash, supra note 55, at 128-29.
65. See Paul Finkelman, Affirmative Action for the Master Class: The Creation
of the Proslavery Constitution, 32 Akron L. Rev. 423 (1999).
66. With the exception of the Adamses, the only non-slaveholding presidents
were Martin Van Buren, Millard Fillmore, Franklin Pierce, and James Buchanan.
None served more than one term. Van Buren, Pierce and Buchanan were Demo-
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the South in fact had enormous power and influence in the na-
tional government. In the 1850s, Howell was both a Speaker of the
House of Representatives and a member of a president's cabinet.
Both men hoped that the Democrats would unite in 1860, with
Howell Cobb as the party's nominee for President. Indeed, Thomas
believed that only the nomination and election of his brother could
save both the party and the nation from the crisis building over
slavery in the 1850s.67
But, Lincoln's election changed the political and constitutional
equation. After November 1860, both Howell and Thomas became
ardent secessionists. They vociferously argued for disunion during
the campaign that led to the election of Georgia's secession conven-
tion in January 1861. In his first attempt at elective office,
Thomas successfully ran as a delegate to that Convention, where
he chaired the "Committee on the Constitution of the State, and
the Constitution and Laws of the United States."68 In this role
Cobb helped shape secession in Georgia.
Thomas soon had greater responsibilities when the Georgia se-
cession convention elected both Cobbs to the Montgomery Conven-
tion that wrote the Confederate Constitution. Howell chaired the
Convention and then served as President of the Provisional Con-
federate Congress. Thomas served in both bodies as well.
Cobb's political activities disrupted the law school and led to a
radically truncated academic year. In June, the school closed as its
students went off to war. Even if the students had returned in the
fall, they would not have found Cobb there to teach them. He too
had left academia for Confederate politics and ultimately, Confed-
erate war-making.
At the Montgomery Convention, Thomas became the leading
draftsman of the Confederate Constitution, and in a sense, became
the "James Madison of the Confederacy." Thomas continued to
serve in the Confederate Congress until that body recessed in June
1861. At that point he returned to Georgia to organize what he
called the "Georgia Legion," but what was later known as "Cobb's
Legion." In July, he returned to Congress, which was then meet-
crats, and their party was controlled by Southerners. Fillmore, a Whig, reverthe-
less looked to the South for his support, especially after he signed the Fugitive
Slave Law of 1850.
67. See McCash, supra note 55, at 179 (footnote omitted).
68. Id. at 206 (footnote omitted).
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ing in Richmond. By the end of August the various companies of
the "Georgia Legion" had arrived in Richmond, and on August 28,
Cobb was commissioned as a colonel in the Confederate army. On
September 5, 1861, he took command of his Legion. He returned to
Congress briefly in November, but retained his commission. When
he left Congress this time it was for good.
Cobb led his troops throughout 1862, and in November of that
year he was promoted to brigadier general, now commanding
"Cobb's Brigade," which included two regiments from Georgia, one
from North Carolina, as well as the Legion he had organized a year
earlier. Near the end of the month the North Carolinians were
transferred to another command, and Cobb gained yet two more
Georgia units. "This makes my entire command Georgians," he
proudly wrote his wife.69
Cobb had little time left to enjoy his new position command-
ing so many Georgians. On December 13, 1862, he was wounded
at the Battle of Fredericksburg, and the thirty-nine-year-old law-
yer-turned-soldier bled to death within a few hours. General Rob-
ert E. Lee eulogized that if the South became an independent
nation, "we will need such a man as General Cobb was to give our
country tone and character abroad."70 Lee's point was well taken.
He understood that the loss from Cobb's death was more cultural
than military. The South, as Lee well knew, had no shortage of
generals and would-be generals. However, it had precious few
scholars and intellectuals of Cobb's caliber.
IV. WRITING THE LAW OF NEGRO SLAVERY
Although he never ran for public office until the secession cri-
sis, Cobb was deeply connected to politics through his brother
Howell. As already noted, in the late 1840s and early 1850s, both
Cobb brothers were staunch Unionists, denouncing the Southern
nationalist followers of John C. Calhoun. Their support for the
Compromise of 1850 forced them to temporarily leave the Georgia
Democratic Party. But, in 1851, Howell won the governorship run-
ning on the ticket of the Constitutional Union Party, which in-
cluded Alexander Stephens and Robert Toombs in its leadership.
69. Id. at 315 (quoting Letter from Thomas Cobb to Marion Cobb (Nov. 29,
1862)).
70. Krick, supra note 55, at 365.
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By 1852, the Cobbs were back in a unified Democratic Party, which
helped Howell return to Congress in 1855.
Sometime around 1850, while Congress and the nation con-
templated the Compromise measures designed to head off a col-
lapse of the Union, Thomas Cobb began writing An Inquiry into the
Law of Negro Slavery. The book reflects Cobb's hope that the
Union could be maintained through strict adherence to legal and
constitutional principles which, as he understood them, would pro-
tect slavery at the local level and in national controversies. The
Inquiry is in part a lawyer's response to the crisis of the 1850s and
a plea for the law to solve the problem of slavery by protecting this
special form of Southern property. As the decade unfolded he
found support for this position in the Supreme Court, especially in
Dred Scott v. Sandford,71 which created important proslavery con-
stitutional doctrine.
The treatise on the law of slavery was simultaneously a practi-
cal manual for lawyers and judges, a moral tome directed at pro-
slavery legislators and a defense of Southern interests. The book
was a singularly important contribution to the proslavery argu-
ment because it was the only major defense of slavery written with
the legal community as its primary audience.
By the time the book appeared Cobb had become a more ar-
dent Southern nationalist, but not yet a secessionist. His volume
reflected these views. His history of slavery, which takes up about
two-fifths of the book, was a proslavery, racist and Southern na-
tionalist account of slavery from antiquity to the present. In this
part of the book Cobb took every opportunity to defend the legiti-
macy of slavery in general and of racially based slavery in
particular.
It took Cobb nearly eight years to write the book. Researching
the history of slavery was particularly difficult. Without under-
statement, he described Athens as "an interior village" and noted
that while living there he suffered from the lack "of access to ex-
tended libraries."72 Cobb traveled to libraries in Washington, Phil-
adelphia and New York, but was unable to make it to the nation's
best library, at Harvard. Instead, he corresponded with Simon
Greenleaf, a retired Harvard Law School professor, who sent him
71. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
72. Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, at ix.
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material for his book. Cobb shared much with Greenleaf: both
were evangelical Christians, temperance reformers and legal edu-
cators. On the issue of slavery and national politics both favored
sectional compromise, support of slavery where it existed and en-
forcement of the fugitive slave laws.v Still, despite these common
interests, there was no reason for Cobb to expect the kind help
Greenleaf gave him. Thus, Cobb's acknowledgement to Greenleaf
in the Inquiry is almost reverential.7 4
Because Athens was so isolated and the library holdings so
weak, Cobb had to travel to Northern cities and to seek the help of
a New England law professor. Of course, many conservatives lived
in New York and Philadelphia where Cobb did much of his work,
and Simon Greenleaf was no abolitionist. Nor for that matter, was
Harvard Law School a hot-bed of antislavery. On the contrary, the
faculty supported the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law of
1850, as did many of the students. 75 Nevertheless, despite his
kind words about Greenleaf, it is possible that the irony of con-
ducting his research on free soil helped shape Cobb's growing pro-
slavery nationalism. The experience alerted him to the necessity
of creating Southern libraries to collect the books necessary to offer
an intellectual defense of what much of the nation, and the world,
saw as the "peculiar institution." Similarly, it may have convinced
him of the need for a law school in Georgia to train Southern law-
yers to defend slavery in the courtrooms of America. It was a year
after the appearance of the Inquiry that Cobb helped found Geor-
73. See Act to Amend, and Supplementary to, the Act Entitled, "An Act Re-
specting Fugitives from Justice, and Persons Escaping from the Service of their
Masters," Approved February Twelfth, One Thousand Seven Hundred and Ninety-
three, ch. 60, 9 Stat. 462 (1850); Act Respecting Fugitives from Justice, and Per-
sons Escaping from the Service of their Masters, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
74. See Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, at x.
Never having visited the extensive University Library at Cambridge, I
took the liberty to apply to the lamented Greenleaf, before his death, to
examine and copy for me from several authors that I could not find else-
where. With a courtesy and kindness, equaled only by his ability and ac-
curacy as a lawyer and a scholar, he cheerfully complied with my request.
The MSS. sent me are in his own handwriting, and I prize them as relics
of a great and good man.
Id.
75. See Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive Slaves: The Anthony
Burns Case, Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 Cardozo L. Rev. 1793
(1996).
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gia's first law school. The Inquiry was one of the assigned texts at
that school.
V. A TREATISE IN DEFENSE OF EVL
Cobb claimed his book had "no political, no sectional pur-
pose."7 6 He did admit, however, the work was likely "biassed [sic]
by my birth and education in a slaveholding State."77 His book
certainly offered some neutral, dispassionate and detailed discus-
sions of the law of slavery. For an attorney practicing law in the
late antebellum South the Inquiry would have been a uniquely
useful tool. Cobb cites many cases on various aspects of the law of
slavery and offers reasoned analysis on many topics. The Inquiry
was certainly the best single source for finding the law of slavery
as it existed at the time.
But, the book was also self-consciously biased. Imbedded in
Cobb's scholarly history of slavery and his impressive analysis of
the law surrounding it, was an aggressive defense of the institu-
tion. The logic of his approach seems obvious. Cobb hoped his his-
tory and legal treatise could survive the scrutiny of both scholars
and legal practitioners, especially those in the North. If open-
minded Northern critics accepted Cobb's scholarship, then they
might also find some truth in his analysis and proslavery theories.
Cobb did not need to persuade Northerners of the righteousness of
slavery, he only had to undermine their attacks on it.
In preparing the Inquiry Cobb followed in the tradition of two
other great treatise writers, St. George Tucker and Joseph Story.
Tucker prepared his famous edition of Blackstone in order to pro-
vide American students with an understanding of the common law
based on American values and legal developments.78 Similarly,
Joseph Story wrote his most significant treatise, Commentaries on
the Constitution,79 in order to create a nationalist history and in-
76. Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, at x.
77. Id.
78. Tucker of course wrote his great work before he began teaching, rather
than after. See 1 Paul Finkelman and David Cobin, An Introduction to St. George
Tucker's Blackstone's Commentaries, in St. George Tucker, Blackstone's Commen-
taries: With Notes of Reference, to the Constitution and Laws, of the Federal Gov-
ernment of the United States; and of the Commonwealth of Virginia x-xi (The
Lawbook Exchange, Ltd., 1996) (1803).
79. 1 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States:
With a Preliminary Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and
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terpretation of the Constitution that would influence and shape
generations of future attorneys and through them politicians and
jurists.8 0
Cobb's goals were similar. He wanted his book to be a major
tool for training lawyers, especially Southern lawyers. He as-
signed it to his law students and had the War not intervened, it is
likely the book would have become a central text throughout the
South. And, just as Story's nationalist and Northern centered
treatise influenced the education and constitutional views of
Southern attorneys, so too Cobb hoped his treatise would influence
the views of some Northern attorneys. Slaves, after all, consti-
tuted a major form of property in half the nation, and so it was
reasonable for him to expect that Northern lawyers would rely on
his treatise and perhaps begin to accept some of his views on the
proper way to adjudicate cases involving slavery.8 '
The book is carefully designed to support the law of slavery,
while at the same time undermining opponents of slavery.
Throughout his book Cobb carefully sets the groundwork for a sci-
entific, moral and religious defense of the law of slavery as it ex-
isted. His few criticisms of the law-such as the suggestion that
rape of a slave be punished-seem to be strategically placed to dis-
arm Northern critics. Cobb himself cannot be seen as a full-fledged
apologist for slavery, because after all, he points out its problems.
Similarly, the legal system that supports slavery is not really all
that bad, because, as Cobb demonstrates, the natural moral and
intellectual inferiority of blacks undermines any complaints about
the legal structure.
Had the War not changed everything, it is easy to imagine law
students and lawyers in the North reading Cobb. In reading about
States Before the Adoption of the Constitution (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833); 2 Jo-
seph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: With a Pre-
liminary Review of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States Before
the Adoption of the Constitution (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833); 3 Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States: With a Preliminary Re-
view of the Constitutional History of the Colonies and States Before the Adoption
of the Constitution (Da Capo Press 1970) (1833).
80. See R. Kent Newmyer, Supreme Court Justice Joseph Story: Statesman of
the Old Republic 181-95 (1985).
81. Most cases involving slavery were not political. Many involved commercial
transactions, suits for debt, or insurance claims. Northern lawyers were often in-
volved in slavery related cases in the federal courts, especially in the Supreme
Court.
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the law of slavery they would have been introduced to Cobb's pro-
slavery theories. The perceptive reader, the student or attorney
with a strong antislavery background and sharp analytical skills,
would doubtless have seen that even Cobb's apparently straight-
forward explication and analysis of the law contained a good deal
of proslavery argument and philosophy. But less careful or intelli-
gent readers--or those without strong or certain views on slav-
ery-might have been easily drawn into Cobb's argument,
bolstered as it was by his intelligent and useful analysis of slave
law. With his prodigious footnotes, clear writing and willingness
to criticize some aspects of the existing law of slavery, 2 Cobb
might have led many Northerners to see some merit in his defense
of slavery.
Southern students, of course, would have come away from
reading Cobb better prepared to defend their most important social
institution from the growing challenge of Northern and British an-
tislavery theory. They would also have learned a great deal about
the day-to-day legal aspects of slavery.
Cobb's historical arguments and legal analysis stem from his
belief that slavery was not "a peculiar institution," but on the con-
trary was normal, moral, and economically productive. His histori-
cal analysis correctly points out that almost all societies have had
slavery. Anticipating the scholarship of our own age, Cobb argued
that slavery was never a "peculiar institution," but on the contrary,
was common everywhere.8 3
Unlike modern scholars, but like many other proslavery au-
thors, Cobb also argued that slavery was essential to the creation
of any great society. Cobb's discussions of Rome and Greece both
implicitly and explicitly compare the South with those great classi-
cal societies, while at the same time showing that Southern mas-
ters were kinder and gentler than the ancients. Quotations from
82. For example, Cobb believed that state legislatures ought to make rape of a
female slave a crime. He even suggested that if a master raped a slave the master
should be forced to sell the slave to another master. This should be done "for the
honor of the statute-book." Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, § 107, at 100. However,
even here his racism overcame his reformist notions, for he also asserted that rape
of a slave was "almost unheard of" and that "the known lasciviousness of the negro,
renders the possibility of its occurrence very remote." Id.
83. See generally Bush, supra note 24 (noting that "the peculiar institution is
a misnomer for slavery"); Patterson, supra note 7, at viii (noting that "[tihere is
nothing notably peculiar about the institution of slavery").
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Plato, Euripides, Juvenal, and other classical writers were
designed to teach the reader that slavery, especially Negro slavery,
was accepted by the greatest minds of Western culture.84 Along
with his voluminous citations of legal sources and careful analysis
of the state of the law, Cobb provided his readers with a proslavery
argument designed to justify slavery to the reader and to simulta-
neously condemn those whose legal theories or doctrines
threatened slavery.
VI. SLAVERY AND NATURAL LAW
Central to his defense of slavery are Cobb's arguments that
slavery is not contrary to natural or divine law, but rather that
enslavement, particularly of blacks, is consistent with nature and
religion. Throughout the book Cobb equates slaves, even in antiq-
uity, with Africans. Although this discussion is often factually in-
accurate, it is excellent propaganda for readers who would be
unlikely to know much about the history of slavery in other coun-
tries. Throughout these arguments Cobb weaves the theory that
blacks are inferior beings who are naturally slaves and better off
under the care and tutelage of Christian white masters.
Cobb begins with a frontal attack on the assumption that
"slavery is contrary to the law of nature." 5 He traces this view to
Lord Mansfield's decision in Somerset v. Stewart88 and regrets that
"even learned judges in slaveholding States ... have announced
gravely, that slavery being contrary to the law of nature, can exist
only by force of positive law."8 7 Cobb then begins an extraordinary
assault on this proposition and a simultaneous defense of the en-
slavement of blacks.
Cobb views slavery as part of natural law. He notes that Hob-
bes believed "that war was the natural condition of mankind,"88
and thus enslaving captured enemies was universally accepted and
legitimate. He reminds his readers that "Aristotle declared that
some men were slaves by nature, and that slavery was absolutely
necessary to a perfect society."8 9
84. See Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, at lxix-lxx, lxxxv.
85. Id. § 3, at 5.
86. See supra note 19.
87. Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, § 3, at 5 (footnote omitted).
88. Id. § 6, at 7 (footnote omitted).
89. Id. § 15, at 17.
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Cobb is not, however, a proponent of the enslavement of just
anyone. On the contrary, he argues that "the enslavement, by one
man or one race, of another man or another race, physically, intel-
lectually, and morally, their equals, is contrary to the law of na-
ture, because it promotes not their happiness, and tends not to
their perfection." 9° He defends the Greek enslavement of their Eu-
ropean neighbors because they "were so far the superiors of their
contemporaries, that it did no violence to the existing state of
things for their philosophers to declare their preeminence, and
draw thence the conclusions which legitimately followed."9 '
While he recognizes that Romans also enslaved other Europe-
ans, Cobb insists that at the "early day . . .the negro was com-
monly used as a slave at Rome."9 2 Implicitly comparing the South
to the Roman Republic, he notes that "[flor her footmen and couri-
ers, the [Roman] wife preferred always the negroes."93 Underscor-
ing the inherent enslaveability of Africans, he notes that "Negroes,
being generally slaves of luxury, commanded a very high price."94
There is, of course, virtually no historical support for these ideas,
but again it is important to understand that most antebellum read-
ers would have had no access to any serious works of history that
could have refuted Cobb's presentation.
Cobb did not limit his notions of universal black enslavement
to Rome. Again, with no serious evidence he asserts that in An-
cient Israel "many of [the slaves] were Africans and of negro ex-
traction,"9 5 and that "lalmong the Egyptians . . . there were
numbers of negro slaves."96 In Cobb's Egypt "the ruling castes...
were of the Caucasian race," while the slaves and many of the
"lower castes... were negroes."97 Similarly, in Assyria, according
to Cobb, "Infidels and negroes... taken captive in war, were re-
duced to slavery."98 Discussing Alexander the Great's empire, he
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at lxxxi (footnote omitted).
93. Id. at xxxiii (footnote omitted).
94. Id. at lxxxv (footnote omitted).
95. Id. at xl.
96. Id. at xli.
97. Id. § 37, at 41-42 (footnote omitted).
98. Id. at lvi (footnote omitted).
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asserts "Here, too, we find the negro still a slave," although he ad-
mitted "[tihe numbers, in ancient times, we cannot estimate."99
"[Tihe negro," Cobb claimed, "was a favorite among slaves" in
the ancient world, 100 although he seemed inconsistent as to why.
He noted that when a Greek Army returned from Persia no one
wanted to buy the captives as slaves because 'their skins being soft
and white, by reason of their having lived so much within doors"
they were thought to be "of no service as slaves."' 0 ' In Athens and
Sparta, the slave markets depended on foreign slaves, and he as-
serted, "Those from Egypt were accustomed to burdens, and were
very enduring. From Egypt principally came the supply of ne-
groes. These were prized for their color, were kept near the per-
sons and were considered slaves of luxury."10 2
Cobb seemed unaware of the contradiction here, between
"slaves of luxury" and those "accustomed to burdens." But appar-
ently, in Cobb's mind, the great virtue of black people was that
they were so universally perfect as slaves-they could be "accus-
tomed to burdens" and could work outside because of their dark
skin, but they could just as well be "slaves of luxury."10 3 This, of
course, reaffirmed the practice of the South, where slaves were val-
uable house servants and equally useful field hands. In Cobb's
mind it did not seem to matter where a black worked, as long as he
or she worked as a slave under the control of a white.
Cobb also supports the enslavement of blacks by arguing that
it has analogies in nature. He asserts that in the animal kingdom
"servitude, in every respect the counterpart of negro slavery, is
found to exist."10 4 Here he offers theories of race that would be
comical, if they had not in fact been taken seriously by some of his
contemporaries. He writes that "[iut is a fact, well known to ento-
mologists, and too well established to admit of contradiction, that
the red ant will issue in regular battle array, to conquer and subju-
gate the black or negro ant."10 5 Once captured, Cobb asserts that
"these negro [ant] slaves perform all the labor of the communities
into which they are thus brought, with a patience and an aptitude
99. Id. at lviii.
100. Id. at lxvii.
101. Id.
102. Id. at lxvi (footnote omitted).
103. Id. (footnote omitted).
104. Id. § 7, at 8.
105. Id.
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almost incredible." i °  This leads him to the remarkable conclusion
that "negro slavery would seem to be perfectly consistent" with
"the law of nature."10 7
Later he argues "like the horse and the cow, the domestication
and subjection to service" of blacks "did not impair, but on the con-
trary improved his physical condition" and thus the "subjection
was consistent with his natural development, and therefore not
contrary to his nature." 08
Such analogies were, of course, not wholly conclusive, because
Cobb realized that the black man or woman was emphatically not
"a mere animal."10 9 A devoutly religious Christian, Cobb fully un-
derstood that blacks had immortal souls and were "endowed with
reason, will, and accountability."' 10 Thus, he argued, enslavement
was only legitimate "if the physical, intellectual, and moral devel-
opment of the African race are promoted by a state of slavery, and
their happiness secured to a greater extent than if left at lib-
erty.""' He concluded that if this was so, then the enslavement of
blacks was "consistent with the law of nature, and violative of none
of its provisions."" 2
His conclusion on this issue was, of course, foregone. Utterly
ignorant of African history or culture, Cobb blithely asserted that
despite "living for centuries in contact with civilization, . . . the
negro tribes of Africa have never received or exhibited its
influences."" 3
VII. RACIAL INFERIORITY AND SLAVERY
More than anything else, Cobb believed that slavery was tied
to race. In the United States he asserted that "the black color of
the race raises the presumption of slavery." i" 4 This, was of course,
true throughout the South." i5 Moreover, through such federal
106. Id. at 9.
107. Id.
108. Id. § 18, at 21.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 21-22.
112. Id. at 22.
113. Id. § 37, at 41.
114. Id. § 69, at 67 (footnote omitted).
115. The only exception, apparently, was Delaware, where after 1840 the vast
majority of blacks were free. Thus, in State u. Dillahunt, 3 Del. (3 Harr.) 551
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cases as Prigg v. Pennsylvania,116 Jones v. Van Zandt,117 and most
of all Dred Scott v. Sandford,118 the United States Supreme Court
similarly accepted a notion that race implied slavery. Thus, from a
normative perspective, Cobb explained, in great detail, that slav-
ery was in fact a racial matter. For Cobb, however, the normative
condition of blacks as slaves merely reflected their racial
inferiority.
A. Biological Inferiority
Cobb argued that blacks were biologically and mentally infer-
ior to whites. Blacks in Africa were "degraded" and "barbarous.""19
"So debased is their condition," he argued "that their humanity has
been even doubted." 120 In both Africa and the United States,
whether free or slaves, they were "habitually indolent and indis-
posed to exertion."12' Cobb dismissed notions that these habits
were caused by either the climate of Africa, the circumstances of
enslavement or even color prejudice. Because "the Maker stamped
indolence and sloth" on the people of Africa, they were best off as
slaves under the guidance of whites. 122
Cobb's view of the abilities of blacks was unambiguous: "the
negro race is inferior mentally to the Caucasian." 23 The "promi-
nent defect in the mental organization of the negro," he writes, "is
a want of judgment. He forms no definite idea of effects from
causes." 124 Cobb admits that young blacks can learn at the same
rate as whites, but when "education reaches the point where rea-
son and judgment and reflection are brought into action, the Cau-
casian leaves the negro groping hopelessly in the rear." 25
Cobb's view of the biological and mental make-up of blacks led
him to conclude that they were perfectly suited, divinely created in
fact, for slavery. He noted that "[tiheir physical frame is capable of
(1840), the court ruled that blackness was not a presumption of slavery. See Mor-
ris, supra note 14, at 21-22.
116. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
117. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215 (1847).
118. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
119. Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, § 32, at 36.
120. Id. at 36-37.
121. Id. at 37.
122. Id. at 38 (footnote omitted).
123. Id. § 30, at 34.
124. Id. § 31, at 35.
125. Id. at 36 (footnote omitted).
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great and long-continued exertion." 126 Yet, at the same time,
"[tiheir mental capacity renders them incapable of successful self-
development." 127 However, their limited mental abilities "adapts
them for the direction of a wiser race."' 28
Significantly, Cobb did not offer these discussions of the racial
abilities of blacks in his long introduction, the Historical Sketch of
Slavery. Rather, they appeared for the most part in the first chap-
ter of his legal treatise, a chapter entitled What is Slavery. Any
lawyer turning to the treatise for a general overview of the law of
slavery, or any student seeking to understand this important field
of law, would naturally begin with this introductory chapter of
Cobb's treatise. Thus, Cobb would introduce the reader to legal
philosophy, some case law and racial theory all in one chapter.
B. The Natural Immorality of Blacks and the Law
As a devout Christian, Cobb was especially concerned with the
moral nature of blacks. In Cobb's view the "moral character"'129 of
the black is clearly deficient. These moral failings, which Cobb be-
lieved were inherent to the race, further justified slavery and the
legal regime that supported slavery.
Cobb asserted that blacks are "naturally mendacious, and as a
concomitant, thievish." 30 He discounted the notion that this was
caused by slavery, because "the prisons and records of the non-
slaveholding States show that enfranchisement has not taught the
negro race honesty, nor caused them to cease from petty pilfer-
ing."131 Modern scholars might argue that conditions in the North
for free blacks were hardly ideal, 132 and that racism led to numer-
ous prosecutions of blacks. 133 But, for Cobb the explanation was
clearly race.
126. , Id. § 44, at 46.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. § 32, at 36.
130. Id. § 35, at 40 (footnote omitted).
131. Id.
132. See David A. Gerber, Black Ohio and the Color Line, 1860-1915, at 60-61,
93-139 (1976); Leon F. Litwack, North of Slavery: The Negro in the Free States,
1790-1860, at 154-55 (1961); Paul Finkelman, Prelude to the Fourteenth Amend-
ment: Black Legal Rights in the Antebellum North, 17 Rutgers L.J. 415 (1986).
133. See Michael Stephen Hindus, Prison and Plantation: Crime, Justice, and
Authority in Massachusetts and South Carolina, 1767-1878, at 61, 78-79 (1980).
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Cobb's assertion that they lack "thrift and foresight" of course
goes along with their natural indolence. 134 But, even with all
these traits, Cobb happily informs his reader that the "negro is not
malicious" and "[hlis disposition is to forgive injuries, and to forget
the past."135
In his desire to defend the enslavement of blacks Cobb ignores
the internal contradictions of his own analysis. Thus, he argues
the Negro's "gratitude is sometimes enduring, and his fidelity often
remarkable" but that at the same time "[hlis passions and affec-
tions are seldom very strong, and are never very lasting."' 38 Simi-
larly, despite being "naturally mendacious," Cobb finds blacks are
also "passive and obedient, and consequently easily governed."' 37
Furthermore, although "lascivious" and unfaithful in marriage, he
argues blacks can exhibit "a degree of faith unsurpassed, and a
Christian deportment free from blemish." 38
The implications of this analysis for law are obvious. Blacks
must be kept under close control, with a tough criminal law, but
one that can be imposed humanely-on a case-by-case basis- to
discipline, punish or restrain the child-like slaves. Because blacks
are "mendacious" their testimony in court is suspect. Because they
are "indolent," it is obvious that they must be whipped. But, be-
cause these are inherent traits, and blacks are also "passive and
obedient," discretion is required in punishment. The "passive and
obedient" slaves need not be punished harshly, although the truly
dangerous ones must be so punished.
VIII. RAPE, MARRIAGE AND THE LAW OF SLAVERY
Historically, masters have considered their slave women as
easily available sexual partners. In some cultures slave concu-
bines were common. In other places, including the American
South, slave women were sometimes used as prostitutes for the
profits of their owners. In almost all slave cultures masters have
freely had sex with their slaves. In the American South most
members of the master class, including non-slaveholding whites,
also saw slave women as easily accessible sexual beings.
134. See Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, § 33, at 38.
135. Id. § 34, at 39 (footnote omitted).
136. Id.
137. Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).
138. Id. at 39-40.
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A. Cobb and Slave Rape
It is hard to know what Cobb actually thought about slave-
master relations. Like any other Southerner, white or black, he
had to be fully aware of the common occurrence of sex between
white men and slave women. This most likely offended his sense of
Christian morality. Given his strong religious and patriarchal
views, it is doubtful he would have condoned white men forcing
themselves on slave women. Indeed, Cobb believes that the legis-
latures of the South ought to consider "whether the offense of rape,
committed upon a female slave, should not be indictable."139 He
even suggests that if a master rapes a slave, the owner/rapist
should be required to sell the slave to a new master. 140 Such a law,
he believes, might be passed for "the honor of the statute-book,"
since he doubted the actual offense was very widespread. 141
But, to punish masters for the rape of a slave would imply that
slaves had rights. This would have opened up a Pandora's Box of
problems for the Southern legal system. The law could give the
slave "no rights or privileges except such as are necessary to pro-
tect [his] existence." 142 Obviously, rape did not threaten the exist-
ence-the lives-of slaves. Furthermore, the effective enforcement
of laws punishing whites for raping slaves would have required
that slaves testify against whites, even against their own masters.
And this simply was not possible under the slave regime. More-
over, since blacks were naturally "mendacious," their testimony
would have been deemed worthless when offered against whites.
Having considered the problem, Cobb, in the end concluded
that the issues were more theoretical than real. He believed that
few, if any, female slaves were ever raped by their masters, be-
cause the very nature of blacks made the rape of a slave rare. "The
occurrence of such an offence," he asserted, "is almost unheard of;
and the known lasciviousness of the negro, renders the possibility
of its occurrence very remote."1 43 Despite the likelihood that rape
of a slave by a master could rarely take place-presumably be-
cause slave women would in fact always give consent-Cobb never-
theless would put such a law into place "for the honor of the
139. Id. § 107, at 100.
140. See id.
141. Id.
142. Id. § 89, at 86.
143. Id. § 107, at 100.
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statute-book" rather than for any practical purpose.144 Since there
would be almost no prosecutions under the law, Cobb could afford
to advocate that for the "honor" of their statute books the Southern
states adopt such a law.
Cobb's advocacy of a law punishing the rape of slaves was in
three ways ultimately a tactic in the propaganda war between the
South and the opponents of slavery in the North. First, it made
Cobb seem reasonable and humane. If readers believed him to be
so they might be more open to his proslavery theories. Second, this
issue gave Cobb a forum for discussing his racial views, and in so
doing, articulate why blacks were best suited to be slaves. Finally,
if the Southern states did pass such a law, it would further en-
hance the claim, made throughout the slave states at this time,
that slavery was a humanitarian, paternalistic system, in which
the stronger and smarter master class protected the weaker, and
less able, slave class.
Ironically, by claiming to protect the slaves from what was tra-
ditionally considered a violation of the honor of the victim, Cobb
was in fact suggesting a method to proclaim the "honor" of the
master class. Equally important, by arguing for such a law Cobb
made himself seem "reasonable" in the debate over slavery. Here
was a slave state lawyer, indeed a slaveowner himself, advocating
the protection of the virtue of slave women. Such a position would
undermine those who might attack Cobb for his proslavery and ra-
cist views.
B. Slave Marriage
The lack of legal protection for slave marriages troubled Cobb,
because it offended his moral and religious sensibilities. He even
admitted that the lack of marital fidelity among slaves was "to
some extent ... [a] fault of the law,"145 because no Southern state
gave any legal recognition to slave marriages. He thought the law
might even be used to "[guard] against" the "unnecessary and wan-
ton separation of persons standing in the relation of husband and
wife." 146 But, in the end, Cobb could not suggest anything more
than a statute preventing the separation of families at "sales made
144. Id.
145. Id. § 36, at 40-41.
146. Id. § 276, at 245-46.
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by authority of the Courts, such as sheriffs' and administrators'
sales." 47 Any other protection of slave marriages had to be
"guided and enlightened by Christian philanthropy."145
Cobb had to back off from a recognition of slave marriage, or a
protection of it, because to do so would undermine the most basic
aspect of slavery: that the slave was the property of the master.
Most Southerners-including Cobb-understood that any legal
recognition of slave marriages would undermine the economic and
social needs of the masters. Indeed, all slave marriages were sub-
ject to the whim of the master. At any moment a marriage could be
destroyed by sale or the migration of an owner. 149 Cobb, as a
master, knew perfectly well that the right to sell slaves was a mat-
ter of economic necessity. He would not let a "false tenderness
for ... negroes" 150 interfere with his profits. He also understood
that selling slaves was a factor in slave discipline. When one of his
female slaves misbehaved, Cobb sold off her four youngest children
as a form of punishment.' 5 ' That Cobb thought separation from
family was a punishment illustrates his ability to disconnect the
practical realities of his life as a master from his racial theories. In
the Inquiry Cobb asserts that slaves have few family ties and in
effect, will not suffer from separation. He notes, for example, with-
out much evidence, that former slaves in Liberia are unfaithful to
their spouses, thus implying that the nature of blacks, and not the
law or even the circumstances of slavery, is what undermines slave
marriages.1 52 The real cause of marital infidelity among slaves, or
former slaves, is the "lasciviousness" of blacks.' 53 Blacks, in
Cobb's mind, are not concerned with the destruction of their mar-
147. Id. at 246.
148. Id.
149. In some parts of the South, between a third and a half of all married
slaves had been separated from an earlier spouse through sale or the migration of
masters. See Herbert G. Gutman, The Black Family in Slavery and Freedom,
1750-1925, at 20-21 (1976). Other data indicate that in some areas at least one in
ten slave marriages were forcibly destroyed by masters. See id. at 146.
150. McCash, supra note 55, at 94 (footnote omitted).
151. See id. Similarly, Thomas Jefferson once directed that as a form of pun-
ishment a slave be sold to "negro purchasers from Georgia" or some "other quarter
so distant as never more to be heard of among us." Thomas Jefferson's Farm Book:
With Commentary and Relevant Extracts From other Writings 19 (Edwin Morris
Betts ed., 1953). Jefferson wanted this removal to appear to the other slaves "as if
he were put out of the way by death." Id.
152. See Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, § 36, at 40-41.
153. Id. at 40 (footnote omitted).
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riages because of their ability to "forget the past" and the fact that
their "passions and affections are seldom very strong, and are
never very lasting" and that a "few days blot out the memory of his
most bitter bereavement."1' 4 Here Cobb followed the lead of
Thomas Jefferson, who had asserted in his Notes on the State of
Virginia that "[tlhey are more ardent after their female" while
"love seems with them to be more an eager desire, than a tender
delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation. Their griefs are tran-
sient."' 55 Thus, the line from the Founders of the Republic to the
Founders of the Confederacy was complete: the law could allow for
the separation of black families and ignore the sanctity of black
marriages, because black people were incapable of lasting love or
marital fidelity.
Masters, of course, knew better. Slaves often absconded to
seek wives and husbands after they were separated by sale. Mas-
ters understood this practical reality, as they advertised for run-
aways by suggesting the slave was headed to where a wife or
husband lived.'5 6
Slaves also ran away to find their children or their parents.
Masters also knew this as well. 157 But, ignoring this reality, Cobb
asserts that the Negro is "cruel to his own offspring, and suffers
little by separation from them."' 58  This analysis relieves the
master of any moral concerns for beating slave children or separat-
ing slave families. The law, which allows both, naturally reflects
this. Cobb provides the intellectual defense for these results.
IX. COBB'S INFLUENCE
If the Civil War and the subsequent destruction of slavery had
not intervened, it is likely that Cobb's book would have become a
standard teaching tool throughout the South, as well as the North.
It would have also become a basic source for practicing attorneys.
Similarly, judges would have relied on Cobb when deciding novel
issues involving slavery.
154. Id. at § 34, at 39.
155. Jefferson, supra note 38, at 139 (footnote omitted).
156. See John Hope Franklin & Loren Schweninger, Runaway Slaves: Rebels
on the Plantation 49-74 (1999).
157. See id.
158. Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, § 34, at 39 (footnote omitted).
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One measure of the importance of Cobb's work is found in the
last treatise on American slavery ever published. In the same year
that Cobb published his Inquiry, John Codman Hurd, a New
Yorker, published the first volume of his ponderous treatise, The
Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United States.159 In Volume
II, which appeared in January 1862, Hurd cited Cobb in a number
of places. Hurd had an extensive discussion of the relation of the
Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution to slavery. He
was "led to devote so much space to its consideration solely by the
observations of Mr. Thomas R.R. Cobb."160 Hurd understood the
power of Cobb's arguments and took the time to confront and re-
fute them. At another point he quoted Cobb on the important dual-
ity of slaves as persons and things in the South.16 1 Clearly Hurd
respected the Georgian, even as he disagreed with him.
So too did the Alabama Court, which in 1861 went out of its
way to challenge Cobb's criticism of an earlier Alabama decision
involving the manumission of slaves. 162 In an 1846 case, the Ala-
bama Court had ruled that slaves could not "elect" to take freedom
under a will, if that option was offered by a master. 163 Cobb had
written, "[tihis suggestion has not been approved by other courts,
and we cannot see the force of it."164 The Alabama Court, in 1861,
complained that "Mr. Cobb" had "overlooked" "the obvious distinc-
tion" between slaves as things and persons when he criticized the
earlier case.16 What is important here is not the outcome of the
case, nor the reasoning, but that in January 1861 the Alabama
Court felt the necessity of answering Cobb because his treatise was
simply too important for the court to ignore. 1 6
Some Southern lawyers and jurists almost immediately recog-
nized the importance of Cobb's work for arguing and deciding diffli-
159. See 1 John Codman Hurd, The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United
States (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1858); 2 John Codman Hurd, The Law of Free-
dom and Bondage in the United States (Boston: Little, Brown, & Co. 1862).
160. 2 Id. at 262 n2.
161. 2 See id. at 408 n2.
162. See Creswell's Ex'r v. Walker, 37 Ala. 229, 236-37 (1861); see also Cobb,
supra note 1, § 363, at 301-02 (criticizing Carroll v. Bromby, 13 Ala. 102 (1848)).
163. See Bromby, 13 Ala. at 106.
164. Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, § 363, at 302 (footnote omitted).
165. Creswell's Ex'r, 37 Ala. at 236-37.
166. It is also possible that Cobb's prominent role in the creation of the Confed-
erate government made the Alabama court take special notice of his criticism of
the earlier decision.
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cult cases. It is quite likely that both attorneys and judges turned
to Cobb to research the law of slavery, but evidence of such re-
search is hard to find for run-of-the-mill cases. In such cases attor-
neys and courts might use Cobb to find the law; they did not need
to cite Cobb because there were ample precedents and solid theo-
retical arguments to decide such slave cases. But, for new legal
issues, or unsettled questions, some judges and lawyers turned to
Cobb and cited him in their arguments and opinions.
The case of United States v. Amy167 illustrates the way law-
yers used Cobb. After a jury found her guilty of stealing from the
United States mails, United States District Judge James Dan-
dridge Halyburton sentenced the slave Amy to two to ten years in
federal prison in Washington. 168 On behalf of her master, Rich-
mond attorney John Howard, he argued that a slave could not be
prosecuted for stealing mail, because the statute involved was only
directed against "persons" and slaves were property. 16 9 Thus,
Howard asked that the verdict be set aside. Judge Halyburton
thought the argument of such "great novelty and importance" that
he delayed ruling on it until Chief Justice Roger B. Taney could
hear the case when he came to Virginia to attend his circuit du-
ties.170 Before Chief Justice Taney, Howard quoted Cobb to bolster
his argument that "statutory enactments never extend to or in-
clude the slave, neither to protect nor to render him responsible,
unless specifically named, or included by necessary implication."17
While Howard was unsuccessful in persuading Taney, his argu-
ment nevertheless illustrates the immediate impact of Cobb on
legal arguments.
Mississippi's highest court began to support its rulings with
references to Cobb within a year after the appearance of the trea-
tise. In 1859, the High Court of Errors and Appeals cited Cobb in
two cases involving slave criminals and two involving the rights of
free blacks and the manumission of slaves.' 7 2 All four cases raised
issues that were not simply legal, but instead, dealt with the public
167. 24 F. Cas. 792 (C.C.D. Va. 1859) (No. 14,445).
168. See id.
169. Id. at 793.
170. Id.
171. Id. at 800 (quoting Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, § 94, at 91).
172. See Minor v. State, 36 Miss. 630, 632-35 (1859); Heirn v. Bridault, 37 Miss.
209, 220, 231, 233 (1859); Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235, 251-52 (1859); George v.
State, 37 Miss. 316, 317-18, 320 (1859).
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policy surrounding the law of slavery. For jurists breaking new
ground, or at least treading on unfamiliar legal turf, Cobb offered
support and guidance.
George v. State17 3 illustrates this. George was convicted of
raping a female slave, and his attorney appealed on the grounds
that no such crime existed in Mississippi. 174 George's attorney re-
lied on Cobb to argue that the law of rape could not be applied to
blacks because "their intercourse is promiscuous" and, thus, the
"violation of a female slave by a male slave" was at worst "a mere
assault and battery."175 He further cited Cobb for the proposition
that the common law did not apply to slaves. 176 In reversing
George's conviction, Justice William L. Harris relied on Cobb to
support the notion that the rape of a slave was only an injury to
the master's property and never to the slave.177 He dismissed as
"unmeaning twaddle" a few cases which found the common law did
protect slaves, and instead cited to Cobb for the opposite proposi-
tion.'17 In the space of four pages in the Mississippi Reports there
are four citations to Cobb by George's counsel and four more by
Justice Harris.1 9 The case of rape of course created morally diffi-
cult issues for the Court, and so the Court turned to Cobb for sup-
port of its ruling. 8 0
More significantly, perhaps, was the Mississippi Court's use of
Cobb in Mitchell v. Wells,' 8 1 one of the most virulently racist opin-
ions of the antebellum period. In this case, Mississippi refused to
allow a free mulatto woman living in Ohio to inherit property from
her deceased father, a white Mississippi planter.'8 2 The woman,
Nancy Wells, had been born a slave in Mississippi, the daughter of
Edward Wells and his female slave. Edward Wells had later taken
Nancy to Ohio, where he formally manumitted her.'8 3 When he
173. 37 Miss. 316.
174. See id. at 317.
175. Id.
176. See id. at 320.
177. See id. at 318.
178. Id. at 320.
179. See id. at 317-20.
180. See id. at 320. In a note following this case the Court reporter points out
that in 1860 the Mississippi legislature made the rape of a slave by another slave a
crime, punishable by death or whipping, "as the jury may decide." Id. at 320 n.1.
181. 37 Miss. 235 (1859).
182. See id. at 264.
183. See id. at 237.
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died, Edward Wells tried to leave Nancy his bed, his watch and
three thousand dollars.' 8 4 In refusing to allow this bequest, the
Court denied that it owed any comity to the free states on issues of
black freedom.' 8 5 In making this argument Justice William Har-
ris relied heavily on Cobb. He also relied on Cobb for the proposi-
tion that blacks--even free blacks-were not entitled to any rights
in Mississippi, unless the state chose to grant blacks such
rights.1,6
Other lawyers and courts also relied on Cobb, or felt it neces-
sary to explain why they rejected him.'8 7 After the War, Cobb's
work lived on as courts tried to figure out all of the legal issues of
slavery that remained in play after emancipation ended slavery.
In Hall v. United States, Cobb's work helped the United States
Supreme Court to conclude that a black man who had produced
cotton during the War was not entitled to any of the proceeds from
that crop, because at the time he was still a slave.18 8 Had he lived
through the war Cobb would have seen judges appointed by Lin-
coln imposing the law of slavery on former slaves and using his
treatise to enrich the widow of a Confederate slaveowner at the
expense of the black man who did the work of actually growing the
cotton.
X. A CODA: THE REALITY OF SLAVE MARRIAGE AND T=E EviLs OF
COBB'S THEORIES
Nearly four decades after Cobb's death, his treatise found its
way into an opinion by Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., who was then
Chief Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court. The
case, Irving v. Ford,18 9 involved two half-brothers and their fa-
ther's estate. The case illustrates the complexity of slave law, and
the fundamental tragedy of the refusal of the Southern states to
acknowledge slave marriages. It also demonstrates the perver-
sity-and essential wrongness'-of Cobb's theories about slavery,
184. See id.
185. See id. at 264.
186. See id. at 259. For a detailed analysis of this case, see Finkelman, supra
note 21, at 287-95.
187. See, e.g., Stephenson v. Harrison, 40 Tenn. (3 Head) 728, 732 (1859) (up-
holding the right of slaves to sue for their freedom under a will, and explicitly
rejecting Cobb).
188. 92 U.S. 27, 30 (1875).
189. 179 Mass. 216 (1901).
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race, marriage and family life. Finally, it places on a human scale
the fundamental evil of the system of law that Cobb defended and
underscores Cobb's complicity with that system of evil.
In his treatise, Cobb argued that slaves-and indeed all
blacks-were naturally promiscuous, unfaithful in marriage and
cared little for their children. The complex, poignant and ulti-
mately sad story in Irving v. Ford illustrates how wrong Cobb was.
In 1846, Robert Irving (later known as Sheridan W. Ford)190
and Julia Ann Gregory, both slaves in Virginia, "went through a
form of marriage" in the presence of Gregory's master. 19 1
Although owned by different masters, Robert and Julia were al-
lowed to live together in the basement of Julia's master, where
they resided for eight years, and had three children. 192
In 1854, the twenty-seven year old Irving, fearing his master
was about to sell him away from his family, escaped to Massachu-
setts and changed his name to Sheridan W. Ford. 193 It is some-
what ironic that his love of his wife made Irving leave his wife.
But the logic of this act was clear: if Irving successfully escaped he
might some day be able to come back for his wife, perhaps with
money to purchase her freedom. Or, perhaps she could also escape
and meet him in the North. Fearful she would do just that, Julia's
master jailed her for five months before sending her to North Caro-
lina, where she remained until after the Civil War.194
The actions of Julia's master illustrate how savvy slaveowners
ignored the theories about slave love and fidelity articulated by
Cobb and other proslavery propagandists. Cobb, like Jefferson
three quarters of a century earlier, postulated that slaves did not
really mind separation from spouses because they lacked the abil-
ity to have a sophisticated sense of love and fidelity. As Jefferson
wrote, "love seems with them to be more an eager desire, than a
190. In the 1860 census, he appears as Sherndon W. Ford. This may be an
error of the census taker, or it may be that during the Civil War he changed the
spelling of his name in honor of the military hero General Philip Sheridan. See
Census Data Base of African-American Communities Project, National Museum of
American History, Smithsonian Institution. I thank James 0. Horton, Director of
the Census Data Base Project, for sharing this information with me.
191. Ford, 179 Mass. at 220.
192. See id.
193. See id. at 217; Census Data Base of African-American Communities Pro-
ject, supra, note 190.
194. See Ford, 179 Mass. at 217.
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tender delicate mixture of sentiment and sensation."195 But Ju-
lia's master knew better; with her husband gone, she too might flee
bondage at the first opportunity, especially if she could be reunited
with her husband. Thus, her master sent her to jail for no crime at
all, except being married to a man who escaped from slavery to
avoid being sold away from his family. Then Julia's master sold
her south.
Julia ended up in North Carolina, where she eventually mar-
ried a fellow slave named Killis Bunn. 196 This was not a betrayal
of either the marriage bonds or her love for Robert Irving. Rather,
it was a realistic understanding that the sale to North Carolina
had preempted any chance of being reunited with her husband.
Slaves sometimes took marriage vows that included the language,
"[ulntil death or distance do you part."197 The sale of Julia was a
de facto divorce from Robert. When the Civil War ended, Julia re-
turned to Virginia to find her children. After Bunn's death she
married another free black, Joseph Brown, in Portsmouth, Vir-
ginia, in 1870.198
Meanwhile, in November, 1856, Irving (now calling himself
Sheridan W. Ford), married another fugitive slave, twenty-six-
year-old Mary D. Armstead.'9 Most likely, by this time Ford no
longer believed it was possible to be reunited with his wife Julia.
He probably knew she had been sold south but may not have
known where. Sheridan Ford and Mary remained married until
his death in December, 1898. During this marriage he fathered
Leonard A. Ford, the defendant in Irving v. Ford.
Despite his new life, with a new wife and new children, Sheri-
dan Ford did not forget his Virginia family. In 1865, Ford con-
tacted his former wife, who had returned to Virginia to find her
children. At Ford's request, Julia Ann sent their son, Robert, to
live with him in Massachusetts. Sheridan twice went to Virginia
where he visited his ex-wife and her second husband. While there
195. Jefferson, supra note 38, at 139 (footnote omitted).
196. See Ford, 179 Mass. at 217-18.
197. Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World the Slaves Made 481
(1974).
198. See Ford, 179 Mass. at 218.
199. See id. While in slavery her name had been Clarissa Davis, but in Massa-
chusetts she took on her new name of Mary D. Armstead. For her age, see Census
Data Base of African-American Communities Project, supra, note 190.
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he "recognized the petitioner Frank Irving as his son."200 Frank
later visited his father in Massachusetts, "where he was recog-
nized ... as a son and brother."201 During his last trip to Virginia,
Ford gave Frank Irving a gold watch, and told him "Son, I am not
coming here any more; it makes me sick in my stomach when I look
at the place and see how I had to go away from my wife and chil-
dren."20 2 He further told his son, "when I die a part of my property
will be yours. You will get your share of it."203
When Sheridan Ford did die, however, in 1898, he left no will
and no provisions for his son Frank Irving to inherit any part of his
estate. The probate court made Leonard A. Ford the administrator
of the estate, as well as the co-heir, along with his sister, Annie E.
Ford. Irving then sued to be made executor and sole heir, on the
grounds that he was a "lawful son."20 4 Irving argued that his par-
ents had been legally married, and thus as the oldest son of Ford,
he was entitled to be the administrator. He further argued that
the marriage between his father and Mary Armstead was void,
thus making his half-brother illegitimate.
Chief Justice Holmes found against Irving on both points. The
marriage to Julia Gregory was never a legal union, and Ford's sub-
sequent recognition of Frank Irving had no legal force. This was a
legally proper outcome, one that was supported by case law from
before and after the Civil War. It was completely consistent with
Cobb's treatise. On this point, Holmes accepted the law of slavery
and applied it to the litigants in Massachusetts.
In his second contention, Irving argued that the marriage be-
tween Ford and Armstead was void, because, as fugitive slaves,
they had no legal right to marry. In making this argument, Irving
asked Holmes to be consistent in applying slave law. Relying on
Cobb's treatise, Irving argued that Ford and Armstead were still
legally slaves in Massachusetts, and thus their marriage in the
state was also illegal. 205 Irving asserted that a slave did not gain
freedom by coming into a free state, and thus could not marry in
that state. Here he was in line with Cobb, who asserted that "a
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fugitive slave, though he may be in a State where slavery does not
exist, is still incapable of contracting, his status remaining un-
changed."20 6 Thus, the marriage between Ford and Armstead was
doubly void, since both parties were fugitive slaves.
Holmes emphatically rejected this point. In Massachusetts,
all men and women were free. There could be no slavery in the
state. Holmes would not speculate on how a return to bondage
might have affected such a marriage, but where the fugitives con-
tinued to enjoy their freedom, they also continued in their legal
right to sue, be sued, own property and marry.20 7 Thus, Holmes
rejected Cobb's theory on runaway slaves, even while implicitly ac-
cepting his assertion that slaves, while under the control of their
masters, could not legally marry.
In 1861, both Holmes and Cobb had gone off to war: one to
preserve the United States, the other to destroy it. Four decades
later Holmes rejected the theories of the dead Confederate general
to protect the property interest of heirs whose father had escaped
to Massachusetts and freedom. Ironically, however, in order to do
this, Holmes had to acquiesce to Cobb's basic proslavery theory
and legal analysis-that slaves in the South had no rights, and
that the law would never recognize them as parents or spouses.
Thus, the fundamental unfairness of slavery remained to haunt
the children of slaves, just as some of Cobb's theories and argu-
ments lived on, long after the demise of the institution he had him-
self died to preserve.
206. Cobb, Inquiry, supra note 1, § 277, at 246 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted).
207. See Ford, 179 Mass. at 222. Irving later asked the courts to consider him a
legitimate heir, but not the sole heir, to his father's estate. He lost on this issue as
well. See Irving v. Ford, 183 Mass. 448, 451 (1903).
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